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Abstract: This paper analyzes R&D policies when the returns to cost-reducing
and demand-creating R&D are imperfectly appropriable and market structure is
endogenous. Previous characterizations of appropriability are generalized to permit
the possibility that own and rival R&D are imperfect substitutes. We also describe
how equilibrium expenditures on process and product R&D, as well as equilibrium
market structure, depend on technological opportunities and spillovers. In contrast
to previous work, diminished appropriability does not necessarily reduce R&D ex-
penditures. For example, under some conditions, an increase in the extent of process
(product) spillovers will lead to an increase in product (process) R&D. We estimate
several variants of the model using manufacturing line of business data and data
from a survey of R&D executives.
1. Introduction
In many industrial organization models, underlying demand and cost conditions
determine the equilibrium number and size of firms ("market structure") as well as
equilibrium values of decision variables such as price, output, and capacity. When
firms invest in research and development (R&D), however, both demand and cost
conditions are subject to change.2 Inmost models of cost-reducing R&D, a specifica-
tion of underlying opportunities for technical change replaces the static production
1YaleUniversity and Stanford University respectively. We would like to thank
seminar participants at Stanford, Chicago, and the. NBER Summer Institute for
their comments. We also received very helpful comments from Stanley Besen,
Michael Salinger, and an anonymous referee. Financial support was provided by
the National Science Foundation's Division of Policy Research and Analysis, the
Fletcher Jones Foundation, and Reiss' Olin Fellowship at the NBER.
2Majorcontributions to this literature are surveyed by Dasgupta (1986) and
Baldwin and Scott (1987). Among the models that have focused upon the re-
lationship between cost-reducing R&D and market structure are: Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1980), Flaherty (1980), Lee and Wilde (1980), Levin (1978), Levin and
Reiss (1984), Loitry (1979), Nelson and Winter (1982), Reinganum (1982), and
Spence (1984).function as a determinant of R&D and market structure. Several of these cost-
reduction models (notably Reinganum (1982), Levin and Reiss (1984), and Spence
(1984)) have also examined how appropriability problems affect private incentives
to perform R&D. Spence, in particular, finds that an increase in spillovers (a de-
crease in "appropriability") dlirriinishes the incentives of individual firms to invest
in process R&D.
This paper extends these models of R&D and market structure in two di-
rections. First, we derive and estimate a model in which firms perform not only
cost-reducing process R&D, but also demand-creating product R&D. By allowing
technological opportunities and the degree of appropriability to differ between pro-
cess and product R&D, we can examine the effect of spillovers on both the amount
and composition of R&D. Second, we generalize previous characterizations of R&D
spillovers to permit the possibility that own and rival R&D may be imperfect sub-
stitutes. We thus consider how variations in the degree of substitution between own
and rival R&D may affect private incentives to undertake R&D.
Although our model is a static, non-stochastic parable for what is undoubtedly
a dynamic, stochastic process, we believe that it yields a number of important
insights about the relationships among R&D spillovers, technological opportunities,
and market structure. We explore these relationships through comparative statics
that show how spillovers affect R&D spending and market concentration. The
importance of these effects is assessed by estimating the parameters of the model
using cross-section R&D data on U.S. manufacturing lines of business, These data
are drawn from several sources, including the FTC Line of Business Program, the
Census of Manufactures, and a survey of R&D executives by Levin, Klevorick,
Nelson, and Winter (1987). The survey data provide more detailed measures of
the extent of technological opportunities and spillovers than have heretofore been
available. Our estimates suggest that there is significant interindustry variation in
the extent and productivity of spillovers. The estimates also help explain, certainanomalies, such as why industries with high spillovers, continue to spend large
amounts on R&D.
2. A Model of Cost Reduction and Demand Creation with Spillovers
2.1. Process R&D and Costs
We assume that firms incur fixed costs (f) and constant marginal costs (C) when
producing output (q), and that process R&D affects only marginal costs. in addi-
tion, we assume that there are three types of process R&D expenditures that affect
a firm's marginal costs: the firm's own investments in process R&D, process R&D
done by competitors, and R&D done by finns outside the industry.3 The effects of
own process R&D and intraindustry spillovcrs are embodied in the i th firm's unit
variable cost function as
=C(r1,X1) (1)
where x is the quantity of prbcess R&D done by firm i, and X1 is the pool of
industry knowledge available to firm i. A discussion of spillovers from outside the
industry is deferred until the empirical section. We model the stock of industry
knowledge available to firm i as
=Xj+W1Xj = x1+w1X1 (2)
wherew1 is a scalar parameter representing the extent of process R&D spillovers
and N is the equilibrium number of firms in the industry. Equation (2) implicitly
assumes that own and rival R&D are perfect substitutes in the pool of industry
knowledge available to firm i, with one unit of own R&D being as valuable as l/w1
unitsof any rival's R&D. The assumption that the R&D of all other firms is equally
The empirical significance of R&D spillovers from outside the industry (espe-
cially from materials suppliers and equipment suppliers) has been documented by
Schmookler (1966), Scherer (1984), Bernstein and Nadiri (1988), and others.valued is somewhat restrictive; it is made here because it greatly simplifies the
model and the empirical specifications that follow.
Several special cases of the cost function (1) have been used in previous work.
When unit costs depend only on the pool of industry R&D (i.e. CC(X1)), we
obtain a process R&D specification identical to that in Spence (1984). Alterna-
tively, if wisset to zero, then unit costs depend only on own process R&D and
we obtain the specification used in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980). We include sepa-
rately own R&D and the pool consisting of own and rival R&D in equation (1) to
emphasize that own R&D contributes to a firm's idiosyncratic capabilities as well as
to an industry pooi of knowledge. This particular specification also emphasizes that
idiosyncratic knowledge is not a perfect substitute for shared industry knowledge.
Levin and Reiss (1984) modelled this possibility with a variant of equation (1) in
which the degree of substitution between own and rival R&D was constrained by
setting w1equalto one. In the empirical section, we will test the cost specifica-
tion in (1) against the nested Dasgupta and Stiglitz, Spence, and Levin and Reiss
specifications.
Finally, to clarify the relationship between own and rival R&D, we compute
the elasticity of unit costs with respect to each type of process R&D:
x1&CC Cx = — = — = a+7zy- (3)
=— = Wz7z (4)
where the subscripts on Cdenotefirst partial derivative arguments. Equation (3)
defines two different elasticities: a1, the elasticity of cost with respect to own R&D
assuming no spillover effects, and 'ye, the elasticity of cost with respect to the
industry pool of R&D. When a finn is a monopolist, we obtain the proprietary
total cost elasticity: a1 + 7r• When the firm is an oligopolist, the second term in
(3) includes a nonproprietary productivity effect. This effect allows for the possible
dilution (at the margin) of own R&D by a rival's R&D. Assuming, for example,that a,and ,arepositive constants, equation (3) implies that increased R&D
competition by rivals (i.e. a higher X)lowersthemarginalproductivity of own
R&D,even though increasingrival R&D lowers own costs.
Theelasticitydefined in equation (4) is aunit-freemeasure of theR&Dexter-
nality effect. It suggests that there is an important distinction betweentheextent
to which usable knowledge spills over to rival firms (as measured by ,)andthe
productivity of that shared knowledge (as measured by 7,), This distinction be-
tween the extent of spillovers and their productivity is often blurred in discussions
of the economic consequences of technological spillovers. To see how the distinction
may be useful, consider two technologically similar industries that spend different
amounts on R&D. This difference might be attributed to the usual appropriability
problem: the industries simply differ in the extent to which firms have access to the
knowledge generated by a rival's R&D. (For example, the industries might differ in
the strength of patent protection or the ease by which products can be reverse engi-
neered.) Alternatively, both industries may have the same extent of R&D spillovers,
but they may differ according to the usefulness of acquired R&D in lowering costs.
2.2. Product R&D and Demand
On the demand side, we depart from previous studies by explicitly modelling prod-
uct R&D, which we assume affects a firm's demand schedule in much the same way
that process R&D affects costs.4 Our specific formulation of how product R&D af-
fects demand draws upon earlier models of product differentiation by Spence (1976),
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and Koenker and Perry (1981). We assume that there is
In this model there is a sharp distinction between process and product R&D
expenditures. We assume that process R&D affects only costs and that product
R&D affects only demand. This distinction is made largely for conceptual conve-
thence. It enables us to label the R&D tradeoffs a firm faces in choosing. between.
demand-creating (e.g. introducing better or new products) and cost-reducing in-
vestment activities. As a practical matter, however, it should be noted that the
correspondence between product and process R&D and demand-creating and cost-
reducing R&D is not so clear, especially because the design and development of
improved products often requires accompanying process improvements.an aggregate utility function representing consumer preferences of the form,
U(Q) U (Giqi + G2q2 + ...+GNqN) (5)
where
C =C(y,Y,), (6)
Qisan industry output index, q is an observable measure of each firm's output,
y is the product R&D done by the i th firm, and Y is a weighted sum of industry
product R&D. The industry pool of product R&D is analogous to the knowledge
pooi of process R&D. Specifically,
(7)
The output weights, the G, are to be interpreted as the perceived quality or at-
tractiveness of the ith firm's product. As before, we restrict our attention to the
case where there are no spillovers from outside the industry.
The output weights in (6) allow R&D expenditures to affect each firm's demand
curve. Note that own product R&D influences demand both directly by altering
the perceived quality of the product and indirectly via its effect on the quality of
other firms' products.5 The implied inverse demands for these goods are obtained
by setting price equal to the partial derivative of the consumer benefit function,
P1 = G1(y1,Yj)=P(Q)C1, (8)
where P is a suitably defined industry price index.
Spillovers in product R&D introduce substitution effects that are similar to
those present in process R&D, Defining the elasticities of C as in equations (3) and
If advertising also shifts demand by changing actual or perceived quality, then





Theseelasticities of product quality with respect to product R&D have interpreta-
tions that are similar to those given above for the elasticities of cost, with respect
to process R&D. Notice, however, thatneednot be positive because increases in
rival R&D may reduce the perceived attractiveness of a firm's product.6
3.Equilibrium
If firms face constant unit costs for process and product R&D inputs, then the profit
maximization problem for a firm is:
max
{qj,xt,y,}
Weassume that firms have Cournot-Nash conjectures regarding the output and
R&D decisions of other firms.7 In addition, we assume that each firm confronts the
same decision problem and that we can restrict attention to symmetric equilibria.
Although these latter two assumpt ions obviously preclude an explanation of intrain-
dustry variations in R&D strategies, more general models cannot be identified with
the data available. Thus, we focus on explaining interindustry differences in process
and product R&D.
In a purely technological sense, the spillover of a rival's product R&D should
enhance the quality of one's own product. However, the output weights, the C's,
reflect both tastes as well as technological attributes. Thus, the hedonic benefits
derived from a product may decrease in response to a rival's product innovation. 'Inour 1984 paper, we used the somewhat more general approach of param-
eterizing the conjectural variation with respect to process R&D. This additional
generality has little empirical payoff, S our data and empirical specifications do
not permit us to identify these conjectures.The three first-order conditions and the free-entry, zero-profit condition that





In equation (12), e is the price elasticity of demand (—PdQ/dFQ). Equations (12)
through (13) have familiar marginal cost equal to marginal revenue interpretations.
Equation (15) is the zero profit condition. The right hand side of this expression
contains the fixed or quasi-fixed costs that prevent urjiimited entry.
To characterize the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables, we manipu-
late equations (12) and (15) to obtain an equation explaining market concentration.
Aggregating equation (15) across all finns, dividing through by industry sales, and
making use of equation (12) yields
H==€(R+D+F). (16)
where H is the Eerflndahl index of concentration and It and D are, respectively,
the industry process and product It & fl-to-sales ratios. The variable F is the ratio
of other industry fixed costs to industry sales. Nested within equation (16) is the
proportionality result derived by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) for process R & D,
1/N=sR.
Next, we transform first-order condition (14) into an equation explaining the
industry product R&D-to-sales ratio (D). Multiplying both sides of equation (14)
by yIP, and dividing through by q, gives
H 1 H D=a5 1—7 +7y1+w(N—1)E . (17)In this expression, a is the elasticity of product quality with respect to product
R&D. The second term contains the appropriability parameters. If product R&D is
interpreted as advertising, and there are no spillovers, then this expression canbe
simplified to the familiar Dorfman and Steiner (1954) condition for the advertising-
to-sales ratio.
Finally, we can derive art equation for process R&D expenditures- The deriva-
tion of this equation is similar to that of equation (17). Multiplying equation (13)
through by xJP gives
f1\ DC DC
R=—(-p) x.—+z
Converting this expression into one involving elasticities of the unit cost function
R-________
1—(R+ D + F)
—a+1 +w(N —
Equation(19) is similar to the process R&D equation estimated in Levin and Reiss
(1984). The left-hand side is the ratio of process R&D to total variable produc-
tion costs. The right hand side "explains" the ratio of R&D to costs in terms of
elasticities of the unit cost function and the parameter representing the extent of
spillovers.
It is important to note the similarities between the structures of the process and
product R&D equations. The first term in each expression (the a) is an elasticity
of cost or price, holding spillover effects constant. We take this term to repre-
sent the technological opporiitnities that firms face in engaging in cost-reducing or
demand-creating research holding spillover effects from the pool of industry R&D
constant. The second term in each of these R&D equations reflects two aspects
of appropriability: the extent and the productivity of spillovers. The next section
examines how R&D spending varies with changes in these underlying technological
opportunity and appropriability conditions.4. Comparative Statics
For expositional clarity and to facilitate the empirical work that follows, the com-
parative statics are based on simplified demand and cost functions. In particular,





where the A's represent unknown positive constants. We also assume for simplicity
that F =0.The system to be analyzed can then be represented as three equations





Thereduced form parameters of interest are those representing spillovers (7r,7y,Wr,
andw9), R&D opportunities (a and au), and the price elasticity of demand (c)
In the special case in which all R&D is directed toward cost-reduction, the
system simplifies to two equations. The comparative statics of this system are
straightforward. Concentration and process R&D intensity rise with increases in
technological opportunities and the elasticity of demand. They also rise with in-
creases in the productivity of spillovers, but fall with increases in the extent of
We conduct the comparative statics on the R&D-to-sales variables (as opposed
to. the absolute quantities of R&D) because our estimating equations are based
upon these variables. One could also consider performing comparative statics on the
equations that determine output, the number of firms, and the absolute quantities
of process and product R&D. The R&D-to-sales variables, however, avoid difficult
estimation issues raised by the use of R&D price deflators. See Griliches (1979).spillovers. Oniy the latter effect is identified by Spence (1984), because in his
model own and rival R&D are perfect substitutes. When proprietary and non-
proprietary R&Dareimperfect substitutes, an increase in spillover productivity, a
form of diminished appropriability, causes R&D intensity to rise because own R&D
is enhanced by increases in industry knowledge?
In the more general model in which R&D may be directed toward both cost
reduction and demand creation, it is impossible to sign unambiguously the com-
parative statics of the complete system for all feasible values of the technological
opportunity and appropriability parameters. When the Jacobian of the system is
positive, as it is when evaluated using the empirical estimates reported in this paper,
increases in the extent of process and product spillovers decrease concentration and
the ratio of total R&D to sales. Increases in the productivity of spillovers have the
opposite effect; they tend to increase own R&D spending and decrease the number
of firms. Under certain circumstances, such as when the extent of spillovers is near
zero, an increase in the extent of process (product) spillovers may induce sufficient
substitution so as to increase the intensity of product (process) R&D.'°
5. The Empirical Specifications
An ideal approach to measuring interindustry differences in technological opportu-
nity and appropriability would be to derive a dynamic analog of the present model
and to test its implications using panel data on R&D spending. Unfortunately, the
only R&D data available over a reasonable period of time are the highly aggregated
NSF data used in our 1984 paper. Here instead we use cross-section line of busi-
ness data collected by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). These data have the
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) develop a model where R&D investment is neces-
sary to acquire external knowledge. They observe that increases in the extent of
spillovers may also increase R&D.
10Levinand Reiss (1986) contains a more complete discussion of these compar-
ative statics.advantage of matching more closely the markets modelled in the theory. They do
not, however, allow us to study the dynamics of R&D spending.
To keep our empirical specifications tractable, we retain the constant elasticity
specifications used in the comparative statics. We account for differences in R&D
spending patterns across industries by allowing these elasticities to vary with ex-
ogenous measures of technological opportunity and appropriability. The following
subsections describe the empirical model, the data, and our estimation techniques.
5.1. The Concentration Equation
The concentration equation is the most straightforward of the structural equa-
tions to convert to an empirical specification. Taking the natural logarithm of both
sides of equation (16) and assuming that the unobserved errors are additive, yields
lnH1=fio+flulne1+/32ln(R+D1+F1)+&1. (26)
In this equation, i indexes lines of business in our sample and b]j is an additive
error. The theoretical model predicts that the intercept (3) should be zero and
the two slope coefficients (firandfl2) should be unity.
The concentration equation contains three theoretical constructs that are not
directly observable: the llerflndahl index, fixed costs, and the price elasticity of de-
mand. In the empirical work that follows, we employ the approximations to these
variables developed in Levin and Reiss (1984). The Herfindahl index was calcu-
lated from estimated distributions of market shares that were obtained by fitting
truncated exponential size distributions to Census of Manufactures concentration
data. Where necessary, the Herfindahl indices were aggregated using sales data to
match FTC line of business industry categories. The price elasticities of demand
were obtained using Levin's (1981) procedure for transforming consumer demand
elasticities reported by Almon et ad. (1974) into derived demand elasticities. Themeasurement of fixed costs is subject to the idiosyncrasies of accounting conven-
tions. (See for example Fisher (1987)). We therefore estimated the model both with
and without a proxy for fixed costs. Our proxy for fixed costs is all assignable and
nonassignable depreciation and amortization as reported in the Line of Business
data for 1976. Our R&Ddataare also drawn from this source.
The concentration equation derived above may be incomplete if it omits impor-
tant fixed and quasi-fixed expenditures that affect entry. One important variable
omitted from the model is advertising. The concentration equation (26) is easily
amended to take into account advertising expenditures, provided one assumes that
advertising affects demand in, the same way that product R&D does. Specifically,
the concentration equation becomes.
in!!4 =/3+ fi1lnE + /321n(R1 + A+A4 + F1) + tbi
where A1 is the industry advertising-to-sales ratio. The advertising data used to
estimate this specification also are taken from the 1976 Line of Business data.
5.2. The R&D Equations
Our theoretical model distinguishes between process and product R&D. In practice,
finns do not make this distinction when they report how much R&D they perform.
This led us to consider two approaches to estimating the parameters of the R&D
equations. The first combines the process and product R&D equations. Adding
both equations together so that the dependent variable is total R&D spending as a
fraction of total production costs gives
R+D- _______






This equation does not require us to distinguish between process and product R&D
in the data, but it has the disadvantage of combining many nonlinear and possibly
collinear terms.An alternative is to allocate total R&D spending between product and process
R&D on the basis of patent; information. Scherer (1984) classified a large sample
of patents according to whether they protected process or product innovations. We
used his tabulations to estimate how much of total R&D spending was for process
and product R&D. By dividing total R&D into process and product; R&D, we are
able to estimate separately the process




1—(R+D+A+F)=5+ 1H ç1+5(N—1) 7)
(29)
R&D equations. We employ this approach because it reduces the computational
burden associated with the nonlinearities in (27). On the other hand, if the weights
used to assign process and product R&D are imperfect then this procedure is likely
to bias or otherwise affect the coefficient estimates.
To estimate (28) and (29), we need to specify how the a, -y, and n parameters
depend on line of business characteristics. We do not have a precise theory that
tells us how we should measure technological opportunity or spillover productivity
across industries. We do, however, have detailed survey data from R&D executives
on differences in opportunity and appropriability conditions across different lines
of business. These survey data have the advantage that they explicitly distinguish
between the conditions that affect product and process R&D Other advantages and
disadvantages of these data are described in detail in Leviii et al, (1987)11
To account for interindustry differences in technological opportunity, we used
survey measures of the extent to which upstream suppliers arid downstream users
Two disadvantages are particularly important here. The respondents were
asked to give answers to questions on an inherently subjective scale, and the survey
questions do not adequately distinguish between the productivity of own and indus-
try R&D. This latter limitation limits our ability to identify convincingly differences
between a and -y. See also the discussion in Levin et al. (1987).contribute to technical progress in a line of business. We expectthat the contribu-
tions of upstream materials suppliers (MATER) and equipment suppliers(EQUIP)
might affect a line of business' investment in process R&D,but the effect might be
positive or negative. Upstream contributions in the qualityof materials or produc-
tion equipment, for example, may diminish the opportunities for complementary
investments downstream, or they may reveal new opportunitiesfor investments
downstream. Similarly, we expect the contributions of downstream users (USERS)
to affect the opportunities for investment in product R&D, althoughthe net effect
is once again ambiguous.
The variables MATER, EQUIP, and USERS were originallyrecorded on a
seven-point Likert scale. We experimented by using actual industry mean responses,
alternative scalings of the responses, and categorical summaries of the responsesto
the survey. Here we report the results obtained when the responses toeach of these
survey questions were recoded to a zero-onevariable. The variables are set to one
when the respondents in a line of business reported that suppliers or users were
"important" contributors to technical progress. Importance wasdefined relative to
the average response on each question. It is either all responses greaterthan or
equal to four or responses greater than or equal to six.
We experimented with otber measures of technological opportunityderived
from the survey, such as one representing the contributions of science to anindus-
try's technology, but, in general, the survey variables did notaccount for much
interindustry variation in a1 or a5, the elasticities of unit costand product quality
with respect to process and product R&D respectively. Thus, we rely upon coarser
categorical summa.ries to capture broad industry differences in the natureof techno-
logical opportunities. In the process R&D equation, we distinguishtechnologies by
the zero-one variables: CHEM, equal to one when the process technology ischemi-
cal in nature, and ASSEMBLY, equal to one when the process technology involves
the assembly of components. In the product R&D equation, we again distinguishchemical industries; we also employ the dummy variable METAL, which is equal to
one for industries that produce primary and fabricated metal products. We expect;
that these latter industries will have relatively few opportunities for performing
product R&D.
Technological opportunities may also depend on industry-specific factors that
cannot easily be captured in survey data or technology variables. We found that
dummy variables for the cement (CEMENT) and the semiconductor (SEMI) in-
dustry improved the results for both the process and product R&D equations. In
addition to these categorical variables, we included in both R&D equations mea-
sures of the energy intensity of the product (ENERGY). This variable is the fraction
of all material costs that were energy-related in 1977. We expect that more energy-
intensive industries are likely to have greater opportunities for lowering production
costs and fewer opportunities for product improvements. In the product R&D equa-
tion, we also included a measure of the extent to which the product is a consumer
good, PCESHR. This variable is defined as the ratio of personal consumption to
total domestic consumption.
The survey contained only a few measures that might serve to represent. the
productivity of spillovers (rny).Weexperimented with WITHIN, a measure of the
importance of the contribution of firms within a line of business to the line of
business' technological progress, and GOVLAB, a measure of the importance of the
contribution of government research laboratories to technological progress within
the industry. Neither of these variables, nor a measure of technological maturity
(AGE) that we used in our earlier paper, appeared to explain variations in the
productivity of the industry pool of R&D. We therefore report the results with a
constant spillover productivity parameter that differs only by whether the industry
is an electronics industry. The variable representing the communications equipment,
semiconductors, and computer electronics industries is ELECTRON.
To measure the extent of spillovers (w),weused data on the effectiveness ofchanisms for protecting the competitive advantages of process and product
•tions. These mechanisms, which are used to appropriate the returns to in-
are: patents to prevent duplication, patents to secure royalties, secrecy,
me, moving quickly down the learning curve, and superior sales or service ef-
As reported in Levin et al. (1987), there is a significant correlation among
ponses to these questions; this led us to reduce the responses to fewer dimen-
ising principal components analysis. Separate principal component analyses
ted on the industry mean responses to the questions concerning product and
s R&D appropriability yielded two readily interpretable components. In each
is, the two components explained more than 60 percent of the overall variance
questions analyzed. The results of the principal components analyses and
•idized principal component scores are presented in Table 1. For both process
oduct R&D, the first principal component (PCi and PDI) loads positively on
:hanisms of appropriation. Thus, PCi and PD1 can be interpreted as repre-
r the strength of appropriability conditions in general; they therefore should
atively related to the extent of spillover parameters, Wrandw. The second
.al components (PC2 and PD2) distinguish between the relative effectiveness
nt and non-patent means of appropriation. Among our selected industries,
r niconductor industry rates highest in overall appropriability, although it is
vest in the relative effectiveness of process patents. Nuts, bolts and screws
.owest in overall appropriability, while the drug industry ranks highest in the
reness of patents.
The Sample
I of 130 manufacturing lines of business responded to the R&D survey. We
ed several of these because the survey responses were incomplete or R&D data
5
We also experimented with responses to a set of survey questions that focus
ability of firms to learn from their rivals. Results with those variables are
ally comparable to those presented here.were unavailable, leaving us with a final sample of 116- Table 2 provides chescriptiw
statistics on the sample. Appendix A contains a summary of our variahle name
and definitions.
6. The Empirical Specifications and Results
6.1. The Concentration Equation
Linear instrumental variables estimates of the concentration equation are :presentei
in Table 3. As in Levin and Reiss (1984), reasonable results could be obta.ined onl
by imposing the restriction that j90. Three different specifications are reportec
in Table 3. each of which treats the price elasticity of demand as an e:xogenou
regressor. The specifications in the table differ according to which fixed a.nd quasi
fixed costs are assumed to affect entry and the long run number of firms -Ineacl
specification, the price elasticity of demand has the correct sign, but we canno
reject the null hypothesis that it is equal to zero.13 The coefficients oa the cost
variables have the right sign and are fairly precisely estimated. Only in tine seconc
specification, however, are we able to accept the null hypothesis that $2= 1.
Our rejection of the model explaining concentration is not too surprising givei
that the Herfinda.hl indicies arid the price elasticities are estimated quantities. W
exploredthe possibility that measurement errors in the price elasticity estimate
biased the coefficients downward, thereby affecting the results. The results in Tabb
3 do not change much when the price elasticity is treated as a stochastic regressor)'
Moreover, corrections for apparent heteroslcedaticity do not significantly alter th
above conclusions. A test of the equation's overidentifying restrictions, however
uniformly rejects the specification of each equation at a 2.5 percent sisnificaric
13Thestandard errors employ White's (1980) suggested correction for hetero
skedasticity.
14Wu-Hausmantests do not reject the null hypothesis that the price e1asticitie
are uncorrelated with the error term.level.'5
6.2. The Process R&D Equation
Estimates of several process R&D equations are reported in Table 4. The first col-
umn of the table is based on Dasgupta and Stiglitz's (1980) no-spillovers model of
process R&D (i.e. 7 =w = 0).This simple model explains 46 percent of the variance
in the dependent variable. The implied process R&D elasticity (as) is positive and
significant for almost every line of business. On average, the estimates imply that
finns lower their costs by .45 % for every doubling in their own process R&D. The
estimates also suggest, however, that the total cost elasticity varies across industries
in several important ways. First, there are significant industry effects. Chemical
processing industries have greater technological opportunities than the average in-
dustry in our sample, and the semiconductor industry has an even higher own R&D
elasticity.16 On the other hand, industries specializing in assembly appear to have
fewer technological opportunities on average. Second, the contributions of upstream
suppliers as reflected in MATER and EQUIP tend to reduce a firm's process R&ID
elasticity, although the coefficients are imprecisely estimated. Finally, lines of busi-
ness with energy-intensive technologies have significantly increased opportunities
for process improvements. Greater opportunities do not exist, however, in energy-.
intensive industries in which material suppliers make important contributions to
technological change.
The second column in Table 4 reports coefficient estimates of a model in which
spillovers are complete (w= 1),as in Levin and Reiss (1984). The intercept term in
indicates that a doubling in the industry pool of process R&D lowers the average
firm's costs by 2.3 percent. This effect is imprecisely estimated, and we cannot
15 For a discussion of this test see section 5 of ilausman (1983).
16 Chesher and Jewitt (1987) have shown that White's procedure is sensitive to
extreme leverage points in the design matrix. The dummy variable SEMI takes
on a value of one at an extreipe point. For this variable, we report the (smaller)
i-statistic associated with the uncorrected standard errors.reject the null hypothesis that spillovers are unproductive (70= 0).Process R&D
spillovers do appear to be important in electronics industries, with a doubling in
the pool of industry R&D leading to a 5.1 % decrease in costs.
The third column reports a more general specification. where the extent of
spillovers wistreated as a constant parameter. This specification has nested within
it the previous two specifications. We can therefore test the hypothesis that own
and rival R&D are perfect substitutes by testing whether a is zero. (Recall that,
if a is zero, own R&D only enters through its contribution to the pool of industry
R&D.) A likelihood ratio test rejects that a =0at the 5 %level.The extent of
spillovers parameter (w) is insignificant, however, implying that we cannot reject
the Dasgupta-Stiglitz model with no process R&D spillovers.17
In evaluating the effect of the pool of industry process R&D on costs, it is
important to separate the productivity effect, as measured by 7, and the extent of
spillovers, as measured by w.Statisticaltests of whether non-proprietary process
R&D is productive (i.e. y =U)are complicated by the presence of w. Under
the null hypothesis that spillovers are unproductive, w is a meaningless nuisance
parameter. Its presence in the model under the alternative, however, affects the
validity of standard asymptotic arguments. The inference problems that arise in this
situation have been discussed by Davies (1977; 1987). We adopted his method for
testing whether = This test statistic rejects the hypothesis that spillovers are
unproductive at the 10% level. Even though this test provides modest support that
process R&D spillovers are productive, an overall goodness of fit test rejects the null
hypothesis that the specification in the third column is a significant improvement
over the Dasgupta-Stiglitz model.
17Ifthe extent of spillovers parameter were truly zero then we could not separately
identify 7 asymptotically. Put another way, although we can test nondegenerate null
hypotheses such as w =1,it is more problematic to test degenerate null hypotheses
such as w =0.'Specificallywe employ the joint significance test procedure outlined in Davies
(1987).The final column in Table 4 reports a specification where the extent of spillovers
parameter is allowed to varywiththe principal component scores for appropriabil-
ity.19 The qualitative conclusions on most of the variables are preserved. The mean
process R&D spillover estimate is still greater than 20 percent. Although PCi has
the expected sign, we carmot reject the hypothesis that w is constant across indus-
tries. The test of the overidentifying restrictions at a 2.5 percent significance level
indicates that there is no model misspecification.
6.3. The Product R&D Equation
Table 5 contains product R&D specifications that parallel the process R&Dspec-
ifications in Table 4. The estimates in the first column indicate that there are
significant industry differences in the elasticity of product quality with respect to
product R&D. Chemicals, cement, and semiconductors have relatively high elas-
ticities with respect to own product R&D. Lines of business that produce metal
products and those that are energy-intensive have fewer opportunities for product
quality improvement. Downstream technological contributions have a positive, but
insignificant effect on technological opportunities. Finally, the negative coefficient
on PCESHR indicates that consumer products industries face lower product R&D
elasticities than do other industries.
The second column in Table 5 reports estimates of a model in which spillovers
are complete (w1).As in the case of process R&D, the electronics industries
appear to have significantly higher spillover productivities. The third column in
Table 5 estimates the extent of spillover parameter under the assumption that it
does not vary across industries. The estimate of the extent of spillovers(.12) is lower
for products than for processes. In both cases, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
w is equal to zero. We can, however, decisively reject the null that a is equal to
zero. A test of whet her product spillovers are unproductive cannot reject the null 'Thestandard errors in this specification have not been adjusted for the sam-
pling variability in the principal component estimates.in the average industry or in electronics. For reasons given in Davies (1987), this
test is likely to have low power against the alternative that the extent of spillovers
is small. Indeed, it is possible to rejet the perfect spillovers model in column 2.
The final column in Table 5 includes the principal component scores as covari-
ates in w5.Westill cannot reject homogeneity across industries in the extent of
spillovers. There are at least two reasons for this result. First, the principal com-
ponent scores are imperfect measures of appropriability. Second, the nonlinearities
in the specification make it difficult to precisely estimate the spillover parameters,
especially because the endogenous variable (the Herfindahl index) enters the spec-
ification in a nonlinear way. The test of the overidentifying restrictions also casts
doubt on this specification.
8.4. Parameter Values for Selected Industries
Table 6 presents estimates of the elasticities of unit cost and product quality with
respect to own and rival R&D for selected lines of business. (The actual elasticity
estimates are the figures in the table divided by 100.) These estimates were gener-
ated using the specifications in the last columns of Tables 4 and 5. The own process
R&D elasticities are estimated with reasonable precision, but the elasticities with
respect to rival R&D are very imprecise. The elasticity of unit costs with respect
to own process R&D is quite low on average; but in the semiconductor industry
it is an order of magnitude larger than the average, indicating that a doubling of
process R&D would lower unit costs by 3.45 percent. It is also relatively high in
industries with chemically-based or electronic technologies (e.g. aircraft, drugs, and
organic chemicals). By contrast, own process R&D elasticities are quite low for food
product and machinery industries.
The elasticity of product quality with respect to own R&D is much higher than
the cost elasticity in most industries. The electronic and chemical industries, as well
as oil field machinery and aircraft, appear to have significantly more productive own
R&D than food, metal products, and, somewhat anomalously, the plastics productsindustries.
The results for the productivity of rival process and product R&D are less
encouraging. In general, there is not enough variation in the conditions affecting
appropriability to distinguish among industries. Despite the modest interindustry
variation, rival process R&D appears to be of greatest importance in electronics
industries. Rival product R&Disalso productive in communications equipment,
but not nearly as much as own product R&D.
'T.Conclusion
This paper modelled the tradeoffs firms face in choosing between imperfectly ap-
propriable cost-reducing and demand-creating R&D. In the theoretical section, we
showed that process and product R&D may be substitutes or complements, de-
pending upon the relative magnitudes of parameters reflecting process and product
spillovers, and technological opportunity. Our empirical results support the view
that differences in technological opportunity affect the resources committed to both
process and product R&D. We also find that proprietary and nonproprietary prod-
uct R&D are imperfect substitutes, but we fail to capture with great precision
interindustry differences in both the extent and productivity of spillovers.
The analysis of the paper leaves some important questions unresolved. Our
distinction between the extent of spillovers and their productivity helps understand
why certain industries, such as the electronics industries, can have high spillovers
and yet also perform large amounts of R&D. A more complete model, however,
would make appropriability conditions endogenous —notonly because firms par
tially control how much of their R&D effort is proprietary or non-proprietary, but
also because technological change itself affects the underlying conditions that de-
termine the extent of spillovers and their productivity. Empirical work by Jafe
(1985) on the technological proximity of firms appears to confirm that firms link
their internal R&D activities to enhance intrafirm spillovers. Our use of surveydata to explain interindustry differences in opportunities and appropriability is a
step forward, but the survey data do not adequately distinguish between factors
determining the productivity of R&D spillovers and the extent to which knowledge
spills over. Finally, although our static model provides some insights about rela-
tionships of R&Dandmarket structure, it is but a small step toward understanding
the more complete dynamic process where market structure evolves through time.Appendix A: The Data and Variable Definitions (Sources in Parentheses)
H 1972 Herfindahi index of concentration. (COM)
C Company$nanced R&D expenditures in 1976. (FTC)
S Total line of business sales and transfers in 1976. (FTC)
Percentage of industry patents that are process related. (Scherer)
.11 = Fractionof sales spent on process R&D. (FTC)
D =(1
— Fraction of sales spent on product R&D. (FTC)
Fraction of sales spent on advertising and other selling
expenses in 1976. (FTC)
Fraction of sales spent on assignable and nonassignable
general overhead in 1976. (FTC)
PELAS Price elasticity of demand (See text. Almon, TO)
WTTHIN A survey measure of the extent to which this industry produces usable
knowledge internally. (Survey: Question IILE.1,)
MATER Equal to one if materials suppliers
contribute significantly to technological progress
(Survey: Question ITI.E.2.)
Equal to one if manufacturing equipment
suppliers contribute significantly to technological progress.
(Survey: Question III.E,3.)
USERS Equal to one if users of the product
contribute significantly to technological progress.
(Survey: Question T1I.E.5.)
COVLAB Equal to one if government laboratories
contribute significantly to technological progress.
(Survey: Question TII,E.7.)
PROCPAT A survey measure of the effectiveness of process patents.
(Survey: Question I.A.1.)PRODPAT A survey measure of the effectiveness of product patents.
(Survey: Question I.B.1.)
FUTURE Equal to one if opportunities
for developing a new process are likely to be better
in the future. (Survey: Question IV.F).
CHEM Equal to one if the technology or product is
largely chemical.
METAL Equal to one if the industry is largely
a metal processing industry.
HOMPRD Equal to one if the product is
homogeneous.
SEMI Equal to one for the semiconductor industry.
ELECTRON Equal to one for electronics industries.
CEMENT Equal to one for the cement industry.
ENERGY The fraction of input materials costs that are energy related
in 1977. (COM)
.PCESHR Personal consumption expenditures divided by output. (10)
DEFSHR Federal defense expenditures divided by output. (10)
AGE Number of years between 1977andthe year in which the industry
was first listed in the Standard Industrial Classifications Index.
PCI First principal component measuring the extent of process
spillovers. (See text.)
PC2 Second principal component measuring the extent of process
spillovers. (See text.)
PD1 First principal component measuring the extent of product
spillovers. (See text.)
PD2 Second principal component measuring the extent of product
spillovers. (See text.)Data Sources
Almon Almon, C. et al. (1974).
COM U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1972 Census of Manufacturers. Washington
D.C.: GPO.
FTC Federal Trade Commission, Annual Line of Business Reports, 1976.
Washington, D.C.: FTC.
TO U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
1972 Input-Output Tables for the United States. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
SchererScherer (1984).





Patents Preventing Duplication .323 .625
Patents for Royalties .388 .559
Secrecy .382 -.234
Lead Time .562 -.325
Learning Curve Advantage .464 -.361





Patents Preventing Duplication .420 -A25
Patents for Royalties .393 -.499
Secrecy .401 -.167
LeadTime .539 .266
Learning Curve Advantage .406 .430
Sales and Service .230 .536
Selected Principal Component Scores
Industry PCiPC2 PD1 PD2
Frozen Foods .13 -.49 -.56 1.66
Grain Mill Products -.74 -.58 -.96 1.26
Nuts, Bolts and Screws -1.94 -.44 -1.52 -.91
Oil Field Machinery .52 -.07 .77 -.23
Organic Chemicals -.14 .79 .31 -1.06
Plastic Products .21 -.19 .44 -.54
Drugs .32 1.67 .81 -1.97
Semiconductors 1.10 -.96 .86 1.09
Communications Equipment .07 -.33 .40 .38
Aircraft .76 -.60 38 .27
These questions correspond to the Yale Survey questions I.A.1 -I.A.6and 1.8.1 -1.8.6.
A higher score on each question meant the mechanism was more effective in protecting the
returns to R&D.Table 2.Descriptive Statistics
Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
PROCESS PATENTS (in %) 31.22 29.59 .00 100.00
PROCESSR&D/SALES (in %) .40 .53 .00 3.03
PRODUCT R&D/SALES (in %) 1.43 1.57 .00 8.00
A (in %) 8.07 6.07 .12 30.88
F (in %) 7.40 3.48 2.18 20.46
.08 .06 .01 .31
PELAS 1.89 1.51 1.00 9.21
ENERGY .06 .07 .01 .55
PCESHR .18 .30 .00 1.00
Dummy Variables:
CHEM .12 .33 .00 1.00
ELECTRON .03 .16 .00 1.00
SEMI .01 .09 .00 1.00
METAL .14 .35 .00 1.00
MATER .12 .33 .00 1.00
EQUIP .14 .35 .00 1.00
USERS .04 .20 .00 1.00
ASSEMBLY .19 .39 .00 1.00
Other Survey Variables:
.14 1.45 -4.93 5.35
PC2 .04 1.20 -2.87 2.74
PD1 .11 1.27 -3.10 4.74
PD2 .03 1.23 -4.99 3.34
SAMPLE SIZE 116Table 3Herfindahl Equation Estimates
Dependent Variable: LN H
In PELAS .082 .216 .154
(.52) (1.00) (.72)






RSE Regression Standard Error .758 1.014 1.044
Overidentification Test 47.74 43.32 38.16
N=116
All specifications were estimated using instrumental variables. Asymptotic t-statistics
are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The asymptotic standard errors employ
the heteroskedasticity correction suggested by White (1982). The instruments include:
a constant term, 1nPELAS, CHEM, ELECTRON, SEMi, WITHIN, MATER, USERS,
EQUIP, AGE, AGESQ, DEFSHR, PCESHR, PROCPAT, PRODPAT, ENERGY, METAL,
ASSEMBLY, FUTURE, CEMENT, and HOMPRD. The chi-squared statistic for misspeci-
fication is the sample size times the R2 obtained by regressing the model's residuals on the
instruments (see ilausman (1983)).Table 4.Process R&D Equation Estimates
Specification
CoefficientVariable w = 0 = 1 ci =
CONSTANT .31 .11 M3 .06
(4.51) (.84) (.06) (.14)
ASSEMBLY -.27 -.23 -.24 -.27
(-4.36) (-3.95) (-3.98) (-3.22)
CHEM .42 .44 .43 .43
(1.92) (2.11) (2.07) (2.06)
CEMENT -1.78 -134 -1.49 -1.45
(-3.88) (-2.91) (-2.62) (-2.26)
r4 SEMI 3.02 2.70 2.72 2.66
(6.67) (4.75) (4.82) (4.34)
ENERGY 2.76 2.53 2.47 2.45
(3.05) (2.52) (2.34) (2.29)
MATER -.07 -.06 -.06 .00
(-.80) (-.74) (-.68) (.01)
MATERtENERGY -2.41 -2.30 -2.34 -4.05
(.2.56) (-2.27) (-2.30) (-.91)
EQUIP -.04 -.03 -.03
(-.60) (-.48) (-.54) (-.84)
CONSTANT 2.36 1.00 1.02
(1.48) (.60) (.45)
71 ELECTRON 2.74 .67 £2
(2.82) (.25) (.22)






Regression Std. Error .450 .436 .435 .441
Overidentification Test 23-99 22.82 22.96 20.40
There are 116 observations. The mean of the dependent variable is .45 with a standard
deviation of 59. Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
The specification in the first column was estimated using ordinary least squares. The other
equations were estimated using instrumental variables. The instrumental variables include
those in Table 3, except InPELAS, and also MATERCENERGY, GOVLAB, PCi, and PC2.
All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity except those for SEMI. (See text.)
The chi-squared statistic is the sample size times the .112obtainedby regressing the model's
residuals on the instruments (see Hausman (1983)).Table 5.Product R&D Equation Estimates
Specification
CoefficientVariable =0 w 1 w =
CONSTANT 2.46 1.90 1.07 -1.06
(7.58) (8.00) (.66) (-.19)
METAL -.99 -.84 -.73 -.79
(-2.77) (-2.87) (-2.42) (-2.60)
a. CHEM 1.36 1.26 1.23 1.04
(1.83) (2.26) (2.07) (2.14)
PCESHR -1.37 4.23 -1.43 4.39
(-2.42) (-2.86) (-3.01) (-3.10)
CEMENT 3.89 3.18 4.16 4.27
(3.77) (3.35) (3.28) (3.23)
SEMI 1.46 -4.16 .4.44 .397
(.79) (-2.49) (-2.43) (-2.45)
ENERGY -11.48 -9.22 -10.67 -10.05
(-5.07) (-4.88) (-4.65) (-4.52)
USERS .74 .73 .42 .36
(.58) (.72) (.45) (.42)
aye USERS*ENERGY -2.18 -2.07 -.26 -3.24
(-.36) (-.43) (-.05) (-.74)
CONSTANT 5.23 3.09 3.85
(1.16) (1.43) (.68)
ELECTRON 99.10 11.92 5.78
(5.43) (.50) (3.09)






RSE Regression Std. Error 1.834 1.280 1.282 1.237
Overidentification Test 56.82 37.76 36.17 34.46
There are 116 observations. The mean of the dependent variable is 1.43, with a stan-
dard deviation of 1.57. Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses below the coefficient
estimates. All equations were estimated using instrumental variables. The instrumental
variables include those in Table 3 and USERSIENERGY, GOVLAB, PD1, and P02. All
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity except those for SEMJ. (See text.) The
chi-squared statistic is the sample size times the R2 obtained by regressing the model's
residuals on the instruments (see Hausman (1983)).Table 6. R&D Elasticity Estimates (x 100)
Industry Or+Trj' ct+ifi'vWJ
FrozenFoods .25 .83 .32
(1.36) (.31) (.91) (1.20)
Grain Miii Products .31 .82 1.41 .76
(3.24) (.31) (7.13) (1.08)
Nuts, Bolts and Screws .22 .98 .53 1.68
(.79) (.41) (0.49) (.97)
Oil Field Machinery .01 .87 2.15 .63
(.13) (.33) (2.37) (.59)
Organic Chemicals 1.02 .81 2.22 .32
(7.75) (.30) (6.18) (.44)
Plastic Products .20 .98 -.02 1.63
(.75) (.41) (-.02) (1.33)
Drugs .76 .88 2.40 .17
(5.47) (.34) (4.26) (.15)
Semiconductors 3.45 1.02 3.24 .94
(7.82) (.20) (2.62) (.42)
Communications .56 1.20 7.35 1.02
Equipment (1.95) (.23) (8.29) (.41)
Aircraft .50 .65 2.22 .30
(4.15) (.24) (6.33) (.60)
Sample Mean .45 .77 1.54 .59
Sample Std. Dev. .43 .17 1.12 .47
Figures in this table are based on the estimates in the fourth columns of Tables 4 and
5. Asymptotic t-statistics are reported in parentheses. To obtain the elasticity estimate,
divide each number by 100.REFERENCES
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